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IN THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F UTAH
000O000

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

C a s e No. 14444
•

M I L L E R , ADAMS and CRAWFORD
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba MAC :
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a c o r p o r a tion, LONNY ADAMS, GLENDA ADAMS,
GERALD CRAWFORD, DIANE
CRAWFORD and LENORA P H I L L I P S ,
:
Defendants/Respondents.
„.-„--•

-

,

:

OOOOOOO

B R I E F OF A P P E L L A N T

STATEMENT O F THE NATURE O F THE CASE
This i s an action by the Appellant A m e r i c a n States I n s u r a n c e
Company against the Respondents for d a m a g e s which the Appellant suffered
when the Respondents b r e a c h e d an A g r e e m e n t of Indemnity.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
No r e s p o n s i v e pleadings w e r e filed by any of the defendants
to A p p e l l a n t ' s Complaint and on O c t o b e r 17, 1974, a J u d g m e n t by Default
w a s e n t e r e d in the D i s t r i c t Court of Washington County, Utah.

On A p r i l 2 4 ,

1975, defendant L e n o r a P h i l l i p s moved to compel s a t i s f a c t i o n of J u d g m e n t .
On A p r i l 30, 1975 defendants G e r a l d Crawford and Diane Crawford a l s o
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moved to compel satisfaction of Judgment.

On January 22, 1976, the

Honorable J. Harlan Burns granted the Motions to Compel Satisfaction
of Judgment as to all defendants in this case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to have the Order of the District Court
granting defendants' Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment vacated. •
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 14, 1973, the defendant MAC Construction Company
submitted an application for contract bond to the plaintiff American States
Insurance Company in connection with the construction of an addition to
the LDS Temple located in St. George, Utah.

(ft. 3-6) In conjunction

with the application for contract bond, on May 14, 1973, defendants MAC
Construction Company, Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams, Gerald Crawford,
Diane Crawford and Lenora Phillips executed an Agreement of Indemnity
in favor of plaintiff American States Insurance Company, agreeing to
indemnify American States for the amounts, if any, which American States
might have to pay under the bond.

(R. 29, 30) Plaintiff American States

subsequently issued the contract bond to MAC Construction Company.
(R. 7)

'•
The defendant MAC Construction Company failed to pay all

of the labor and material claimants in connection with the construction
project referred to above.

Pursuant to the terms of the bond, the plaintiff

American States paid to the claimants the sum of $13,363.65. (R. 1-2)
-2~ ' .- :"
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On March 7, 1974, prior to the time the labor and material
claimants were paid by plaintiff American States, a meeting was held
between representatives of defendant MAC Construction Company and
plaintiff American States concerning this claim. As a result of that
meeting, MAC Construction Company assigned to American States a
partial interest in two mechanics liens which it had filed on the Sun Stone
Condominium Project located in St. George, Utah, as an inducement to
plaintiff American States to pay the labor and material claimants under
the terms of the bond, inasmuch as the claimants were pressing the
defendant MAC Construction Company for payment. (R. 65-67)
No payments were received by plaintiff American States on
the assignment of liens or from any of the defendants under the Agreement
of Indemnity. On April 15, 1974, plaintiff American States filed a Complaint
in the District Court of Washington County, Utah. (R. 1-11) The defendants
Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams and Lenora Phillips were personally served
on April 19, 1974; the defendant MAC Construction Company was served
on May 21, 1974 by serving its process agent Frank A. Allen; and the
defendants Gerald Crawford and Diane Crawford were personally served
on May 13, 1974. (R. 13-17, 20) No responsive pleadings were filed by
any of the defendants ard their defaults were therefore entered with a
Judgment by Default being entered on October 17, 1974, after a hearing
concerning the claim for.attorney's fees.

(R. 18, 21, 28-30) The

Agreement of Indemnity was reduced to Judgment at this time. (R. 29,30)
•:

- 3 -

'

......
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On November 11, 1974, a Supplemental Order was issued
against all of the defendants and delivered to the Sheriff of Washington .
County for service. The same was returned unserved with the notation
that the defendants Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams, Gerald Crawford,
Diane Crawford and Lenora Phillips had moved from the State of Utah
and that no officer of the defendant MAC Construction Company could be
found.

(R. 32, 62)
On November 25, 1974, plaintiff American States was contacted

by representatives of Cedar Valley Development Corporation, who had
taken over the Sun Stone Condominium Project, and who asserted that
the liens filed by the defendant MAC Construction Company were "invalid
and/or grossly exaggerated. n On December 4, 1974, plaintiff American
States agreed to accept the sum of $6, 666. 00 from Cedar Valley Development Corporation in exchange for a release of the Assignment of Liens.
(R. 68) American States accepted the offer of Cedar Valley Development
Corporation because the validity of the Assignment of Liens had been
challenged and none of the defendants could be located to confirm or deny
this allegation, nor to assist the plaintiff in any legal action to enforce
the liens.
It was not until garnishment and execution proceedings were
initiated against the property of the defendants that they showed any interest
in the litigation.

(R. 33-42) Thereafter, on April 24, 1975, defendant

Lenora Phillips filed a Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment.
- 4 .

••'.'
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(R. 43,

44) On April 30, 1975 defendants Gerald Crawford and Diane Crawford
also filed a Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment.

(R. 45-47)

On May 20, 1975, defendant Lenora Phillips filed a Motion to Vacate
Judgment.

On December 30, 1975, the Honorable J . Harlan Burns issued

Orders granting the defendants 1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment
and denying defendant Lenora Phillip's Motion to Vacate Judgment.

(R. 130-

133) An Amended Order dated January 22, 1976, extended the Order
granting the Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment to all defendants.
(R. 136-137) It is from that Order that plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MOTIONS TO COMPEL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT RAISED .
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES WHICH WERE IMPROPERLY AND UNTIMELY
FILED.
Each defendant in this case was personally and properly
served with Summons and notice of plaintiffs Complaint. Despite such
notice, none of the defendants filed responsive pleadings, nor did any of
them appear in Court to answer the allegations in plaintiff ! s Complaint.
Thus, the Default Judgment entered in plaintiff's favor and against defendants
was proper and in accordance with the laws of this State. If any of the
defendants had good reason for their failure to answer or appear in defense
of this matter, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
a means by which they could attempt to set aside the Default Judgment.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The rule states that a Motion to set aside a Judgment must
be made within a reasonable time and if the Motion is based upon such
reasons as excusable neglect, then it must be made within three (3) months
after the Judgment is entered. Again, the defendants failed to take anysuch action under Rule 60(b) within a reasonable time. As noted above in
the Statement of F a c t s , defendant Lenora Phillips did make a Motion to
Vacate more than six months after the Judgment was entered and the trial
court properly denied the defendants Motion.

Peck v. Cook, 29 Utah 2d

375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973).
Also, approximately nine (9) months after their Default
had been entered and six (6) months after the Default Judgment, the defendants made Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment.

One of the basis

of the defendants 1 Motions was that the previous Assignment of Liens
operated as a n satisfaction in full" of the claims of the plaintiff against all
of the defendants.

The Assignment of Liens was executed on March 7,

1974, and plaintiff1 s Complaint was not filed until April 15, 1974. Having
failed to answer plaintiff's Complaint, the defendants then attempted to
r a i s e affirmative defenses in the guise of a Motion to Compel Satisfaction
of Judgment. In this regard, Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in part as follows:
n

(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, . . .
l a c h e s , . . .payment, r e l e a s e , . . . waiver,
and any other matter constituting an
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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avoidance or affirmative d e f e n s e . . . .
n

(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is required, other than those as to the amount
of damage, are admitted when not denied in
the responsive pleading. — fl
It is clear that the defendants, through the use of their Motions
to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment, a r e attempting to evade the clear
language of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court interpreting these rules, and the doctrine of r e s judicata.
It should be noted that the defendants, in their one lone attempt, failed to
succeed in vacating plaintiff1 s Judgment.

In denying defendants 1 Motion to

Vacate, the trial court ruled in conformance with the opinions of this
Court. In Airkem Intermountain* Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P . 2d
429 (1973), the defendant did file an Answer to plaintiff f s Complaint and
participated otherwise in the proceedings prior to trial, but due to some
confusion at the time of trial in the withdrawal of defendant's counsel, the
defendant was not represented at the trial and neither did he appear personally. The Court entered a Default Judgment in plaintiff's favor and the
defendant subsequently moved to vacate the Judgment on the ground of
excusable neglect. The trial court denied the defendant's Motion and the
Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
f!

— The trial court must balance two valid
considerations; on the one hand, to relieve
the party of the judgment vitiates the effect
of r e s judicata and creates a hardship for
the successful litigant by causing him to
" 7 -

"'

,•'"

•..•'.":
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prosecute more than once his action and
subjecting him to the possible loss of
collecting his judgment. On the other hand,
the court desires to protect the losing party
who has not had the opportunity to present
his claim or defense. The rule that the courts
will incline towards granting relief to a party,
who has not had the opportunity to present his
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court
level, and this court will not r e v e r s e the
determination of the trial court merely because
the motion could have been granted. For this
court to overturn the discretion of the lower
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment,
the requirements of public policy demand more
than a m e r e statement that a person did not
have his day in court when full opportunity for
a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal
representative. The movant must show that
he has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control." [Emphasis is original]
It seems clear that the defendant in Airkem made at least an effort to p a r t i cipate in the case, whereas in the instant case the defendants ignored the
proceedings entirely until some six (6) months after Judgment.

Thus,

when the defendants found that, for good reason, they could not set aside
the Judgment, they attempted an "end run 11 .with the Motions to Compel
Satisfaction of Judgment.
The general rule concerning an attempt by the defendant to
answer after the entry of a Default Judgment is stated in 61 Am. J u r . 2 d ,
'

•

•

•

'

•

'

•

.

Pleading, Section 354:
"Upon the failure of the defendant to answer
the declaration or complaint within the time
allowed by law, and upon the entry of default,
in the absence of fraud, the right of the
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant to participate in the litigation is
terminated, and the subsequent filing of an
answer or d e m u r r e r on his part is unauthorized and void unless upon due and regular
proceedings the default is first set a s i d e , . . . I f
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the general rules outlined
above in numerous cases.

In F . M . A . Financial Corporation v. Build, I n c . ,

17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P . 2d 670 (1965), the plaintiff sued defendant on a note
and to foreclose a mortgage which the defendant had given to plaintiff's
assignor.

The defendant pled the defense of lack of consideration but the

trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The defendant

made later attempts to interpose other defenses but without success and the
defendant appealed.

In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court

commented on the defendant's actions:
"Defendant made belated attempts to interpose other defenses: accord and satisfaction;
account stated; and laches, none of which had
been asserted in its answer. We think the
trial court was justified in regarding them as
without merit. Under Rule 8(c) U. R, C. P .
these are classified as affirmative defenses
which are required to be stated in the answer*
The failure to plead such an affirmative
defense generally results in its exclusion as
an issue in the c a s e . . . . " [Emphasis added]
In Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 P. 2d 562 (1959),
plaintiff obtained a Judgment against the defendant through stipulation by
the p a r t i e s . Approximately a year and a half later, the defendant attempted
what appears to have been a collateral attack on the Judgment by filing a
pleading entitled n Defendant ! s Request for Claim Against Plaintiff 1 .
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

trial court denied this Motion and the Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
"Treating the assigned e r r o r s in r e v e r s e ,
in January, 1958, long after the trial and
entry of judgment defendant filed what
appears to have been an abortive pleading
called 'Defendant's Request for Claim Against
Plaintiff 1 , claiming to own the granary
Eskridge built and removed from the property.
We think the court properly refused to entertain
the m a t t e r . . . . , ! [Emphasis added]
I n T o d a r o v . Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P . 2d 839 (1955), the
Utah Supreme Court made a clear statement of its application of the general
rule.

The Court did not apply the rule in Todaro, because of the particular

facts in a complicated conflicts and choice of actions case, but made the
following statement of the rule:
"In support of the argument that the trial
court should not have allowed respondent
to produce evidence as to his affirmative
defense, appellants present us with an a r r a y
of legal authority to the effect that a party
is concluded in a subsequent matter not only
as to m a t t e r s actually determined in the
prior action, but also as to other issues
which could properly have been determined.
These authorities present the policy of
the law to foreclose piecemeal litigation
and hold, generally, that a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff is an adjudication, not merely
as to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of
action, but, as to the nonexistence of any
defenses thereto. We accept this reasoning
but cannot force an application of the doctrine
to the present case. — "
The defendants 1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment in
this case a r e based in part on the grounds that the Assignment of Liens
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operated as satisfaction or payment in full of plaintiffs claim. This is
clearly an affirmative defense which must be pled in a responsive pleading
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the decisions of this Court.
As noted in 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Payment, Section 115:
fI

At common law, evidence of payment was
admissible under a general denial. However,
payment is an affirmative defense under
modern codes such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and must be pleaded by the
one resisting the claim
.fT
The defendants failed to plead their affirmative defense in
any responsive pleading and cannot now be allowed to raise their defense
in an improper and untimely filed Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment.
The defendants' attempt to invalidate the Default Judgment in
favor of plaintiff also runs afoul of the doctrine of r e s judicata. The general
rule applicable to this case is stated in 46 Am. J u r . 2 d , Judgments, Section
404:. "
f!

A final judgment on the m e r i t s , rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies,
and as to them constitutes an absolute b a r to
a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand, and cause of action, whether the plaintiff
fails to recover in the first action, or is s u c c e s s ful in recovering a part of its claim. The
judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which
cause cannot again be brought into litigation
between the parties upon any ground, or for any
purpose whatever, in the absence of some factor
!l
invalidating the judgment.
The rule is further elaborated in Section 417:

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The phase of the doctrine of r e s judicata
precluding subsequent litigation of the same
cause of action is much broader in its application than a determination of the questions
involved in the prior action; the conclusiveness
of the judgment in such case extends not only
to m a t t e r s actually determined, but also to
other m a t t e r s which could properly have been
raised and determined therein. This rule
applies to every question relevant to and
falling within the purvue of the original action,
in respect to m a t t e r s of both claim or grounds
of recovery, and defense, which could have
been presented by the exercise of due diligence. ,T
Annotation, Doctrine of Res Judicata as Applied to Default
Judgments, 77 A . L . R . 2d 1410, Section 2, considers the question as follows:
!,

The default judgment, like any final and valid
judgment rendered on the m e r i t s after contest,
precludes the plaintiff from thereafter maintaining
an action against the defendant or his privy on
the same cause of action. On the other hand, the
plaintiff may maintain an action of the judgment,
and the defendant cannot, in this action or any
other proceeding, relitigate the question of the
validity of the cause of action upon which the
judgment was rendered, or otherwise contest
the existence and amount of the judgment debt. "
[Emphasis added]
The Utah Supreme Court agrees with the principles noted above,
as expressed, for example, in the case of Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Utah
428, 132 P.2d 111 (1942). In affirming the trial court f s action in dismissing
the plaintiff1 s Complaint on the basis of the doctrine of r e s judicata, the
Court stated as follows:
n

The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of r e s judicata r e s t s is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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issue more than once; that, when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties, and those in privity with them in law
or estate. . . . Public policy and the interest
of litigants alike require that there be an end
to litigation, and the peace and order of society
demand that matters distinctly put in issue
and determined by a court of competent j u r i s diction as to parties and subject matter shall
not be retried between the same parties in any
subsequent suit in any court. M [Emphasis
added]
The instant case is not one where service of Summons was had
by publication or some other indirect means. Each of these defendants
was served personally and thus had full notice of the plaintiff ! s Complaint
and their obligation to answer that Complaint. The defendants chose not to
avail themselves of their right to answer or of their opportunity to be heard.
Yet they cannot deny that such an opportunity was given to them, nor can
they deny that they failed to take advantage of such opportunity.

Therefore,

the doctrine of r e s judicata precludes any hearing at this late date on their
allegations of satisfaction of plaintiff's Complaint, for the issue is settled
and conclusive upon the parties by the Default Judgment.
'

POINT II

THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS
OF THE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL.
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, the plaintiff disposed
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the collateral assigned to it by defendants without notice to defendants,
due to the fact that plaintiff1 s interest in the collateral had been challenged
and the defendants were unavailable to refute or explain this challenge.

In

view of the foregoing, any attempted notice to the defendants would have
been futile.

Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the

Agreement of Indemnity which had been reduced to Judgment, specifically
provided that no notice needed to be given.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that
the plaintiff is exempt from any requirement to give notice to defendants
who were in default.

Rule 55(a)(2) reads as follows:

"Notice to Party in Default. After the entry
of the default of any party, as provided in
subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be
necessary to give such party in default any
notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve
any notice or paper otherwise required by
these rules to be served on a party to the action
or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 5(a). 11
The provisions of this rule are clearly applicable to the instant case, and
by failing to answer, the defendants lost whatever right of notice they may
have had.
In addition, the defendants expressly waived any right of notice
by written agreement.

The Agreement of Indemnity signed by all of the

defendants, provides in part as follows:
"SIXTEENTH: That the Contractor and the
Indemnitors shall continue to remain bound
under the t e r m s of this Agreement even though
the Surety may have from time to time hereto-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fore or hereafter, with or without notice to or
knowledge of the Contractor and the Indemnitors,
accepted or released other agreements of
indemnity or collateral in connection with the
execution or procurement of said Bonds, from
the Contractor or Indemnitors or others, it
being expressly understood and agreed by the
Contractor and the Indemnitors that any and all
other rights which the Surety may have or
acquire against the Contractor and the Indemnitors
and/or others under any such other or additional
agreements of indemnity or collateral shall be
in addition to, and not in lieu of, the rights
afforded the Surety under this Agreement. n
[Emphasis added]
Defendants alleged in their Motions to Compel Satisfaction of
Judgment that the provision in the Agreement of Indemnity cited above is
invalid, since Section 70A-9~501(3)(b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), provides that the notice requirement contained in Section 70A-9504(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), cannot be waived.

The

plaintiff does not necessarily agree with the defendants* contention, but
even if true, the claimed invalidity of the waiver of notice provision is an
affirmative defense.

If the provision is invalid, it was also invalid at the

time the plaintiff filed its Complaint, and this should have been pled as an
affirmative defense in answer to plaintiffs Complaint.
The applicable rule is stated in 47 Am. J u r . 2d, Judgments,
Section 919, as follows:
l!

It is a general rule of law that in an action
on a judgment, the original cause of action
is not examinable on the m e r i t s , and that no
matter of defense may be asserted which ~
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existed anterior to the judgment and which
might have been set up in the original
n
proceedings.
[Emphasis added]
It is clear that any claim of the invalidity of the provision in
the Agreement of Indemnity existed from the time the agreement was signed
and, therefore, also existed anterior to the Judgment and should have been
set up in a responsive pleading.

This fundamental principle has been incorp-

orated into the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provide as follows:
11

(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and s a t i s f a c t i o n , . . .
laches,
payment, r e l e a s e ,
waiver,
and any other m a t t e r constituting an
avoidance or affirmative d e f e n s e . . . .
"(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is required, other than those as to the amount
of damage, a r e admitted when not denied in
n
the responsive pleading
The Utah Supreme Court consistently has followed the rule
cited above. In Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P. 2d 507
(1956), the Court dealt with a rather complicated inheritance case but
repeated the general rule as follows:
M

. . . It is also true that generally a failure
to plead an affirmative defense results in
its waiver and excludes it as an issue in
the c a s e . . . . ! l
See also the language of the Utah Supreme Court opinions cited in Point I.
Additionally, the Agreement of Indemnity signed by the
defendants which was incorporated into the plaintiff's Complaint was reduced
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to Judgment and by not contesting the same, its provisions became
binding on the parties. In this regard, 47 A m . J u r . 2 d , Judgments,
Section 1207, provides as follows:
"There is considerable authority supporting
the rule that a default judgment for the plaintiff
in an action to recover on a contract, p r o m i s sory note, or other instrument, is r e s judicata
with respect to the existence and validity of
the contract or i n s t r u m e n t . . . . M
The substance of the adversary system under which we function
is that a party must plead and prove any claims or defenses which he has
available to him.

The defense asserted here is not n self executing" and

r i s e s to no greater height than any other defense such as lack of consideration,
usury, contributory negligence, e t c , , all of which are lost if not timely
asserted.
The Order of the trial court holding that the waiver of notice
provision of the Agreement of Indemnity was invalid is clearly contrary to
the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases cited herein*
It should be noted that despite the lack of any obligation on the
part of plaintiff to give notice of the disposition of the collateral to defendants,
the plaintiff was prevented from giving such notice by the defendants' own
actions. As previously set forth in the Statement of Facts above, a
Supplemental Order was issued on November 11, 1974, against all of the
defendants and delivered to the Sheriff of Washington County for service.
The Sheriff returned the Order unserved with the notation that the
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defendants had moved from the State of Utah and that no officer of the
defendant MAC Construction Company could be found.

In other words,

the defendants n made themselves s c a r c e " but now r a i s e the contradictoryargument that the plaintiff had a duty to search them out in order to serve
notice upon them. Even if the plaintiff had such a duty, the defendants by
their own actions made it impossible for the plaintiff to perform such a
duty. F u r t h e r , the plaintiff was satisfied and is satisfied that the amount
plaintiff received for the release of the Assignment of Liens was the greatest
amount it could have received from any party.
POINT i n
IN ANY EVENT, PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO A HEARING TO PROVE
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL.
The defendants claim that despite the plaintiff1 s Default Judgment,
they still retain the right of notice of the disposition of the collateral under
Section 70A~9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

Plaintiff

disputes this contention as set forth in Points I and II, but conceding
defendants 1 position for the sake of argument, plaintiff contends that it has
the right to prove that the value it received for the disposition of the collateral
was the fair market value and that the defendants a r e entitled to credit on
the Judgment in this amount.

It does not appear that this Court has ruled

on the question, but decisions from other jurisdictions support the plaintiff ! s
position.
In United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F . 2 d 692 (C. A- 5
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j

T e x . ) , cert. den. 43 L.Ed. 2d 777, 95 S. Ct. 1566, the creditor sold the
collateral without notice to the debtor under Section 9-504(3) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The Court ruled that the better view is that
the c r e d i t o r s failure to give notice creates, at most, a rebuttable p r e sumption that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt,
placing on the secured party the burden of proving that the fair market
value of the goods sold was l e s s than this amount. The same result was
reached in Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash.App. 866, 496 P . 2d
966 (1972). In this case, the Court reversed the trial court's Judgment which
had denied a deficiency to the creditor on the basis that the creditor had
failed to give proper notice to the debtor.

The Court held that the creditor's

failure to give notice does not result in a forfeiture of the creditor's right
to a deficiency judgment.
In Community Management Assoc, v. Tousley, 505 P . 2d 1314
(Colo. App. 1973), the creditor repossessed the debtor's automobiles and
resold them without notice to the debtor.

The appellate court reversed the

trial court's decision that the creditor was barred from a deficiency
judgment, ruling that the creditor or secured party retained the right to a
deficiency judgment, but the failure to give notice places upon the secured
party the burden of proving the market value of the collateral by evidence
other than the amount received on the sale.
These cases illustrate the better view, particularly where the
creditor or secured party had good reason to believe it was not required
y,v
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to give notice as in the instant case, that the m e r e failure to give notice
should not operate as a bar to a deficiency judgment-

Plaintiff contends

that, in any event, it has the right to a hearing where it may offer evidence
to prove that the amount received in the disposition of the collateral was
the fair market value and that the defendants remain bound for the balance
due on the Default Judgment.
CONCLUSION
The basis of the Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment
a r e (1) that the Assignment of Liens operated as a payment in full of the
obligation, and (2) that the waiver of notice provision of the Agreement of
Indemnity signed by the parties is invalid.

Both of these are affirmative

defenses which the defendants were required to plead and prove in
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
by their failure to timely a s s e r t the same, they were lost.

By granting

the defendants 1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment the trial court
has allowed the defendants to a s s e r t affirmative defenses some six (6)
months after the Default Judgment had been entered and without the same
ever

having been set aside.
It should also be noted that notwithstanding the fact that all

the defendants were personally served with the p r o c e s s , they showed a
complete disregard for the same until garnishment and execution proceedings
were initiated against them.
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff urges this Court to
:
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vacate the Order granting the defendants' Motion to Compel Satisfaction
of Judgment.
Dated this 12 th day of April, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
J . Anthony Eyre
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to J. MacArthur Wright, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Phillips,
75 North 100 East, St. George, Utah 84770; and to Frank A. Allen,
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents Crawford, 747 East 100 North,
St. George, Utah 84770, this 12th day of April, 1976.

Secretary
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